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INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD
U.S. securities regulation, sensitivity to competing national interests, sov-
ereignty, predictability, uniformity and fairness.8 7
Yvonne G. Grassie
ETHICAL CONFLICTS IN THE RECOMMENDATION
OF POISON PILLS
The proliferation of corporate mergers and acquisitions has spawned
law firms specializing in corporate takeovers. 1 These law firms generally
counsel both targets and acquirors. This may confront firms with ethical
conflicts of interests.2 For example, in a recent newspaper account, New
York's Skadden, Arps, Meagher & Flom was challenged for drafting
over two dozen poison pill plans to repel hostile takeovers and, within a
year, arguing in federal court against the constitutionality of similar
plans on behalf of a hostile aggressor.3
This recent development considers the ethical repercussions of a single
law firm recommending antitakeover poison pill plans to some clients
and shortly thereafter contesting the constitutionality of similar plans on
behalf of other clients. Part I reviews the American Bar Association
standards governing concurrent and subsequent representation.4 Part II
applies these standards to specialty firms who recommend then challenge
similar antitakeover poison pill plans.' This development concludes that
87. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
1. See Berner, Conflict of Interest Case, Developments and Vicarious Disqualification, in Thir-
teenth Institute on Securities Regulation 621, 623-37 (1981) (Berner chronicles the development of
law firms from solo or small firms in 1910 when the largest New York law firm had 17 lawyers to
large, multi-office firms of the 1980s).
2. See generally Miller and Warren, Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Issues for the Inside and
Outside Counsel, 40 Bus. LAW. 631, 631-33, (1985); see supra, Berner note 1 at 623-27.
3. See, Waldman, Skadden Arp's Poison-Pill Stance Raises Conflict of Interest Concern, Wall
St. J., July 23, 1986, 2, at 1, col. 3. Skadden, Arps is cocounsel with two other law firms. The
defendant's answer to the suit challenged the poison pill provisions as against state law, as over-
reaching the powers of the directors, and if the plan was authorized by state law, the plan impermis-
sibly burdened interstate commerce and violated the United States Constitution. Skadden, Arps
denied the representation conflicted with its drafting of poison pill plans for other clients.
4. See infra notes 6-25 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
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attorneys should abstain from challenging in federal court the constitu-
tionality of antitakeover plans substantially similar to those they have
previously recommended.
I. ABA STANDARDS GOVERNING CURRENT AND
SUBSEQUENT REPRESENTATION
The American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility (Model Code)6 and Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules)7 address conduct involving conflicting interests of clients. These
professional standards distinguish between concurrent representation of
clients with adverse interests and representation of a client with interests
adverse to a former client's interests.
Model Rule 1.9 prohibits an attorney from representing a subsequent
client with a "material" adverse interest to a former client in a related
subject without the consent of the former client.8 Model Rule 1.7 pros-
cribes representing a client when representation is "directly adverse' to
another client without the informed consent of each client and a reason-
able attorney belief that representation will not compromise either attor-
ney/client relationship. 9
While the Model Code does not specifically address successive repre-
sentation, applicable canons-prescribing expected standards of con-
duct-address attorney representation of clients with conflicting
6. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Model Code) (1969).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Model Rules) (published at 52 U.S.L.W. 1)
(1983).
8. MODEL RULE 1.9 provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client consents after consultation; or
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former
client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when the information has
become generally known.
9. MODEL RULE 1.7(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly
adverse to another client unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the rela-
tionship with the other client; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation.
If an attorney's representation is "materially limited" because of duties to another client, Rule 1.7(b)
requires the attorney to obtain the clients' consent and reasonably believe that the relationship will
suffer no adverse effects before proceeding.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/12
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interests.1" Disciplinary rule 5-105, however, prohibits an attorney from
representing a client if it would compromise the attorney's independent
judgment or require the attorney to represent opposing interests.11
Three distinct dangers arise when an attorney represents clients (con-
currently or subsequently) with adverse interests: (1) possible use or dis-
closure of client confidences; (2) the danger of loyalty dilution; and
(3) the threat of decreased vigor on behalf of the clients during the
representation.1 2
Attorneys must possess undivided loyalty and use independent judg-
ment in representing clients.I3 Concurrent representation of clients with
conflicting interests may interfere with an attorney's professional judg-
ment and thus may reduce the vigor of representing the interests of one
or both clients.14 The Model Code's ethical standards require informed
consent from clients with conflicting interests. 5 Furthermore, it must be
10. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (concerning the duty to
exercise independent judgment); Canon 4 (requiring the preservation of client confidences); and Ca-
non 9 (cautioning against "even the appearance of impropriety") (1969).
11. Disciplinary rules (DR) are required behavior. They give the minimum level of conduct for
attorneys, and apply to all attorneys, without regard to the nature of the attorney's activities.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (Preamble and Preliminary State-
ment) (1969) states:
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent professional
judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance
of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing different
interests, except to the extent permitted under DR5-105(C).
12. See Developments: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1247,
1987-1303 (1981) (The authors distinguish between risks to clients where the attorney concurrently
represents clients with conflicting interests in an adversity situation from risks where the attorney
represents clients with conflicting interests in a subject matter that is nonadverse. In both situations,
ethical codes may proscribe the dual representations).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983). Comments to
Rule 1.7 state that impaired loyalty may interfere with an attorney's decisions on the proper courses
of action. In assessing the likelihood of a conflict situation which will impair the attorney's
independent judgment an attorney should consider: (1) the length of the attorney/client relationship;
(2) the legal services provided; (3) the likelihood of an actual conflict; and (4) the effect of a conflict
on each client's interests. Id.
14. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1983) requires the uncompromised
exercise of an attorney's professional judgment and fulfillment of client expectations of undivided
loyalty. The ethical considerations of Canon 5 list interests that may affect the judgment of an
attorney. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT EC 5-3, 5-15, 5-18 (1983).
15. Model Code of Professional Conduct DR5-105(C) (1983) states:
In the situations covered by DR-5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple clients
if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to
the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the
exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
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"obvious" the attorney can competently represent both clients.' 6 Under
the Model Rules, the attorney need only "reasonably believe" the dual
representation will not impair either attorney/client relationship.'
7
The judiciary regulates the legal profession. Courts, however, disagree
over the appropriate scope of proscribed conduct during simultaneous
representation. For example, the Third Circuit requires firm disqualifica-
tion when representing one corporate client against another corporate
client whose unrelated service is complete at the time suit is filed."8
Finding a continuous relationship, the Third Circuit believes the possibil-
ity of adverse effects likely without proof of actual detriment. Further-
more, the Third Circuit believes that disqualification after "the
appearance of impropriety" enhances the public's belief in the integrity
of the legal system.19 While concurrent representation is not per se un-
ethical, the Third Circuit's approach favors a broad proscription against
concurrent representation. In at least one informal opinion, the ABA
ethical committee has sanctioned the Third Circuit's approach.20
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit permits multiple representation of cli-
ents with adverse interests stemming from related disputes if informed
client consent is obtained and the attorney reasonably believes loyalty
will not be compromised.2 Evaluating all facets of the dual representa-
16. Id. The Model Code requires both the informed consent of each client and an attorney
ability to represent both clients without compromise. Informed consent alone is insufficient. See
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op., No. 84-1508 (1984) ("Lawyer
employed by state agency as nonlawyer may not, under most circumstances, represent his fellow
employees before other agencies in matters against agency for which lawyer works." The Committee
noted that even with client consent, the attorney's personal interests would influence the representa-
tion so the representation was prohibited. The lawyer's belief that he would not compromise the
representation was measured on an objective standard by the Committee.)
17. See supra note 9.
18. See International Business Machines v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978) (hereinafter
IBM). Plaintiff Levin sued IBM in 1972 charging IBM with violations of the Sherman Act and state
law. In 1977 IBM moved to disqualify plaintiffs' lawyers because they had performed legal work for
IBM in 1970, 1972, 1974 and 1976. Id. at 274-81.
19. Id. at 283. See also Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1976).
20. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Op. No. 1495 (1982) (The
Model Code prohibits dual representation despite the corporation's use of most of the area's law
firms results in a hardship to retain counsel for the corporation).
21. See Unified Sewerage Agency of Washington County, Oregon v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339
(9th Cir. 1981). Defendant Jelco sought legal advice concerning an interpretative contract dispute
between Jelco, a general contractor, and subcontractor Ace. The law firm informed Jelco that they
represented another subcontractor, Teeples, in a dispute against Jelco involving schedules for con-
crete work in the same project. The Teeples/Jelco dispute eventually resulted in a law suit. In its
Jelco/Ace dispute, Jelco hired the firm after full disclosure and the court affirmed a finding of Jelco's
informed consent. After Jelco discharged the firm in the Ace controversy, Jelco sought disqualifica-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/12
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tion, the nature of the conflict and the likelihood of actual conflict, the
Ninth Circuit requires a definite nexus between the concurrent represent-
atives before firm disqualification.22 To the Ninth Circuit, informed con-
sent overcomes potential conflicts of interests even when arising from a
related matter. The Ninth Circuit's approach is unwilling to presume an
irrebuttable ethical violation, preferring instead to consider the
circumstances.23
When a firm retains a client with interests "substantially related" but
adverse to a former client, most courts irrebuttably presume shared con-
fidences.24 This substantial relationship standard seeks to balance the
rights of clients to choose their own attorneys with the interest of mini-
mizing the chance of disclosure of confidences. Absent a relationship
between the subject matter of the former client's representation and that
of the subsequent client, the attorney may generally represent a subse-
quent client with adverse interests to a former client.25
The ethical conflicts of simultaneous representation of clients with ad-
verse interests and representation of clients with interests adverse to a
former client are distinguished by differing burdens placed on the attor-
ney regarding the propriety of the conduct. Concurrent representation
generally requires an attorney to overcome the presumption that the dual
representation constitutes an ethical violation-a fairly steep burden.
Subsequent representation and the substantial relation test eases the evi-
dentiary burden for the attorney. The attorney may defeat the substan-
tial relation test by proving a minimal chance of using the former clients'
confidence.
tion of them in the Jelco/Teeples suit. The court found no facts which indicated the attorneys failed
to vigorously represent both clients. Id. at 1342-52.
22. Id. at 1350-52.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1981); West-
inghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee, 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 216 F.2d 920 (2d. Cir. 1954). See generally Miller and Warren, supra note 2, at
635-36.
25. See Miller and Warren, supra note 2, at 635-36. Miller and Warren note that courts differ
as to the meaning of substantial relationships. The majority of courts look for factual or subject
matter similarities. Thus, if the opposing party in a suit is a former client and that party challenges
the current representation, the law firm should prove the former representation is unrelated to the
current representation and the likelihood of receiving relevant confidences is minimal.
19871
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II. THE ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF RECOMMENDING THEN
CHALLENGING POISON PILL PLANS
Law firms specializing in corporate takeovers may function as both
prospective counselors, recommending particular business actions, and
current advisors on legal proceedings.26 Conflict of interest issues arise
when on behalf of an acquiror client a law firm challenges the constitu-
tionality of poison pill plans substantially similar to those drafted by the
firm for different clients.27 Although these clients are not adversaries in
the litigation challenging poison pills, their interests conflict because a
successful constitutional challenge to poison pill plans casts into doubt
the continued validity of the other client's poison pill plan. Furthermore,
a constitutional challenge may shake the original client's expectations of
loyalty from the firm. The ethical implications of this conduct may be
examined under two standards: the concurrent client standard and the
former client standard.
There is no test for labeling a client "former" or "current." A client
on retainer or a client which utilizes a firm over a period of years may
generally be deemed current. 28 A difficulty arises, however, when a cli-
ent seeks to retain a merger specialty firm solely for advice on antitake-
over poison pill plans. When the firm drafts a poison pill which the
corporation adopts, the firm's single rendition of services has a continu-
ing effect on the corporation. This situation has elements of both former
and current client status.
If a continuing attorney/client relationship is evident, the original cor-
porate client may be deemed current. 29 Under the Model Code, concur-
26. The same law firm may represent both targets and acquirors in separate takeovers without
violating ethical provisions. In such representations, the attorneys should employ all legal argu-
ments to advocate their clients' cause although it may mean arguing differently on the same issue
according to the clients' position. Model Rule 1.1 demands that an attorney competently represent a
client. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1969). Competence is also required
in the MODEL CODE BY CANON 6 ("a lawyer should represent a client competently") and DR 6-
101(2) (forbidding an attorney from handling a case without adequate preparation) MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(2); Canon 6 (1983).
27. Conflict of issue challenges typically arise in a litigation setting as one party moves to dis-
qualify an opposing attorney on the grounds of conflicting interest. However, disqualification is not
the only type of challenge for conflicts of interest. Bar associations may investigate ethical violations
in a disciplinary fashion. Committees providing opinions on ethical conduct also illuminate posi-
tions on conflicts of interest.
28. IBM, 579 F.2d at 281. In IBM, the court found that IBM was a current client of the law
firm although the firm used a fee for services billing system and there were no current matters being
handled at the time suit against IBM was filed.
29. Id.
[Vol. 65:273
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rent representation of clients with adverse interests is suspect. The
original clients that adopted anti-takeover poison pills arguably have in-
terests that conflict with an acquiror's challenge to such measures. 30 No
one would deny that if the original corporate client was the target in the
takeover suit representation of the aggressor by the same firm, the firm's
conduct would violate the Model Code.31 Model Code DR 5-105(c) re-
quires that each client consent after attorney explanation of the nature of
the conflict and the possible ethical violations involved.32 Even with in-
formed client consent, however, the attorney must find it obvious that
the representation will be uncompromised.33 In the dual representation
at issue, it is not obvious that an attorney can adequately represent both
clients at the same time.
Defending the ethical challenge, the law firm may deny the existence
of a conflict by distinguishing the poison pill under attack from the plans
drafted by the firm. 4 If, however, the two plans are substantially simi-
lar, the conduct seems to violate the Model Code because the adversity
30. The original clients' interest is the preservation of poison pill plans to guard against hostile
takeovers.
3 1. If the original clients were parties to a litigation challenging the poison pill provisions, the
clients would move to disqualify the opposing attorneys. Under those circumstances, it is reasonable
to assume the attorneys garnered information from the original clients that is useful to the attorneys'
preparation for the subsequent case. The subject matter, Le., the poison pill provisions, would be
identical to the current matter. Even if informed consent were obtained from the original clients (a
very doubtful proposition), the courts would probably disqualify the attorneys because the attorneys
could not adequately represent the subsequent clients.
32. See supra note 15. Elective client consent necessitates informing the clients of the dual
representation and how the two representations may interact. Procuring client consent after full
disclosure influences a court in a disqualification hearing. See Malamed v. ITT Continental Baking
Co., 592 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1979) ("crucial additional fact" that the plaintiff, the only party poten-
tially harmed by the conflict of interest, retained the attorneys after disclosure. Because of plaintiff's
informed consent, the court refused to disqualify in the absence of real and substantial harm to
plaintiff's interests). See eg., Waldman, supra note 3. In a recent Wall Street Journal article, un-
identified clients of the law firm Skadden, Arps found "disturbinZ" the fact that Skadden, Arps was
co-counsel to a lawsuit challenging shareholder rights plans. This suggests the clients did not con-
sent to Skadden, Arp's representation of Dart and probably were unaware of the representation until
publicized. In such circumstances, the attorney/client relationship may suffer.
33. See supra note 15. The question of obvious adequate representation was explored in Unified
Sewerage Agency of Washington County, Oregon v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
34. Without a relationship between the two shareholder plans, the Model Code does not forbid
the dual representations under canons 4 or 5. As canon 9 and the appearance of impropriety may be
insufficient to disqualify an attorney for conflict of interests, courts would generally allow both repre-
sentations. See supra note 10. See also Waldman, supra note 3. In the Skadden, Arps article,
attorney Shapiro stated the shareholder plans under attack differ from the plan developed and rec-
ommended by Skadden, Arps for more than twenty-five clients.
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between the clients is direct and may compromise the attorney's profes-
sional judgment.
The Model Rules prohibit representation of a client that is "directly
adverse" to another client.35 The Model Rules, however, do not pro-
scribe dual representations of generally adverse interests "such as com-
peting economic enterprises."" Challenging poison pill plans like those
recommended to other clients extends beyond competing enterprises. If
the poison pill plans are successfully challenged, the continued validity of
the original clients' plan is doubtful. Dual representation is possible
under the Model Rules only if the clients give informed consent and the
attorney reasonably believes he can represent both clients without com-
promise.37 Thus, a subsequent constitutional challenge to similar poison
pill plans violates the Model Rules when there is no informed consent of
the potential conflict and the interests seem directly adverse.
If the clients that sought advice on poison pills are deemed former
clients, the law firms must assess the effects of dual representation.3,
Although confidences gathered from the original clients will not be used
directly against the clients (as the clients are not parties to the law suit),
there exists a danger that such confidences may be used inadvertently in
bolstering the later client's arguments.3 9 Applying the most generous in-
terpretation of the substantial relationship test, the attorneys must dispel
the presumption that the attorney's judgment may be clouded and that
confidences are shared.' ° In short, labeling the corporate clients which
adopted the poison pill plans "former" clients eases the challenged attor-
ney's burden of showing the absence of conflict.
Defining a substantial relationship between the subject matter of the
35. See supra note 9.
36. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983). The comments to
Rule 1.7 state that an attorney need not obtain consent for representation of generally competing
interests.
37. See supra note 9. In certain circumstances, an attorney may be unable to secure consent.
See eg., ABA BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 124, No. A-58 (1986) (The New
Jersey Supreme Court permitted dual representation of co-defendants in a civil rights action after
recognizing a public entity cannot render consent. Other considerations of adequate representation
became crucial).
38. Model Rule 1.9 explicitly prohibits subsequent representation in "the same or a substan-
tially related matter." The lawyer must evaluate the two representations and determine if the subject
matter comes in the category. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983),
39. An attorney must not reveal the confidences of a former client. Additionally, an attorney
may not utilize information from a former representation to prepare a subsequent defense.
40. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 65:273
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two clients only initiates the inquiry. The conflict in the dual representa-
tion transcends appearances and potential misuse of confidences-the es-
sence of the conflict inheres in the precedential value of a successful
constitutional challenge advanced against the poison pill plans. Conflict-
ing interests remain debatable if an attorney challenges a provision under
existing state law because unfavorable state decisions have minimal pre-
cedential value in other states.41 If the decision inheres in a court's inter-
pretation of the state's individual corporate law, other states may
disregard the decision as inapplicable to their corporate statutes. How-
ever, a challenge to substantially similar poison pill plans based on a con-
stitutionally impermissible burden on interstate commerce is another
story.42
A decision in a federal district court which declares an antitakeover
plan unconstitutional has greater impact than a state court decision. The
decision will stand as precedent in the district which rendered the deci-
sion. While a decision from one district court is not binding on other
district courts, other districts may follow the decision because the ration-
ale turns on constitutional analysis rather than an interpretation of state
statutes. Furthermore, a district court decision which declares poison
pill plans unconstitutional would probably be appealed. If the circuit
court of appeals affirms the plan's unconstitutionality under the com-
merce clause, similar business plans throughout the circuit are at risk of
invalidation. Furthermore, a well-reasoned opinion in one circuit may
influence other circuit courts addressing the same issue to adopt the con-
stitutional rationales. This increases the risk that similar poison pill
plans in other jurisdictions may be invalidated. Herein lies the ethical
conflict because by vigorously advocating one client's interests, the attor-
neys endanger the interests of the other clients. The potential preceden-
tial reach of constitutional attack elevates this conflict from one where
41. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT comments (1983). The Comments to the
MODEL RULES provide that representing parties with "antagonistic positions" in different cases is
acceptable provided the dual representation would not adversely affect either client. The Comments
find it acceptable for an attorney to assert different positions in separate trial courts, but possibly
unacceptable if the cases are before the appellate court at the time. The Comments, however, seem
to focus on attorney representation in the litigation matters. There is a difference between advancing
the best possible argument for a litigation and developing a prospective corporate plan which the
clients adopt. For a law firm to later challenge the constitutionality of substantially identical plans is
tantamount to arguing both sides of the validity of the plans before the Supreme Court.
42. See Edgar v. Mite, 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (holding an Illinois antitakeover statute uncon-
stitutional on grounds of an impermissible burden on interstate commerce).
19871
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attorneys represent different sides of a legal issue to one where an attor-
ney openly represents adverse interests.
III. CONCLUSION
When a law firm recommends poison pill plans for one client then
challenges the constitutionality of like poison pills for another client, the
attorneys effectively question the constitutionality of their own advice.
Consequently, to avoid any ethical dilemma, attorneys who provide plan-
ning or drafting services should abstain from challenging the constitu-
tionality of antitakeover plans substantially similar to those they have
previously recommended.
Catherine R. Phillips
THE IMPACT OF THE SEC'S CASES AGAINST LEVINE
AND BOESKY ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
INVESTMENT BANKERS AND
ARBITRAGEURS
The Securities and Exchange Commission's recent, highly publicized
allegations of insider trading against Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky, and
others announced to Wall Street intensified SEC enforcement of insider
trading sanctions against many professionals in the heart of the Wall
Street community. Reactions to these cases form a wide spectrum of
views. Some commentators applaud the crackdown on insider trading.'
Others believe the SEC has gone too far.2 Many investment bankers and
1. Glaberson, The SEC's Message to the Market on Insider Trading, Bus. WK., June 9, 1986,
at 83 (commentary praising the SEC for finally attacking the heart of information abuse); Laderman,
The Epidemic of Insider Trading, Bus. Wx., April 29, 1985, at 79-92 (although an overzealous SEC
could impair routine information gathering, vigorous enforcement effort against insider trading is
needed).
2. See, e.g., Macey, SEC Vigilant on Insider Trading-But Is It Within Law?, Wall St. J., May
28, 1986, at p. 34, col. 3; Seligman, Is Dennis a Menace?, FORTUNE, June 23, 1986, at 127 (criticizing
the SEC for failing to show how the investing public was hurt); Steward, SEC Insider Trading Case
Could Clog Pipeline Between Bankers, Arbitragers, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1986, at p.3, col. 2; The
SEC v. Wall Street, Wall St. J., May 28, 1986, at p. 32, col. 1 (criticizing the SEC's view that the
purpose of regulating the security markets is to ensure an honest crap game and charging that Wall
[Vol. 65:273
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